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Abstract
This paper develops an empirical strategy to measure maverick-like behaviour. It ap-
plies the strategy to a dataset that contains interest rates charged by mortgage providers
in Australia from January 2003 to October 2006. The Reserve Bank of Australia raised
its cash rate five times in this period, which provides a natural setting to observe suppli-
ers’ responses. We examine suppliers’ behaviour both in terms of the rates they charge
and the time it takes them to change their rates as a response to a systemic increase in
costs. These empirical observations suggest that the development of a theory for maverick
behaviour be focused on dynamic, asymmetric models and informed by institutions and
market dynamics that are relevant to the case at hand.
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1 Introduction
Economics has played a major role in the development and shaping of competition law.1
Nevertheless, there exists a considerable gap between economic theory and practice (as re-
flected in guidelines and case law). In particular, while the analysis of unilateral effects relies
∗Both authors acknowledge the financial support of the ARC (Grants DP 0557885 (Menezes) and 0663768
(Breunig and Menezes)). We are grateful for CANNEX for providing us with the data. We thank seminar
participants at the 2007 Australian Law and Economics Conference and the 2007 Australasian Meeting of the
Econometric Society. The usual disclaimers apply.
1For a discussion of the goals of U.S. antritust law, see Bork (1978). See also Whinston, 2006, Chapter 6.
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a great deal on economics and econometric techniques developed over the last two decades,
the analysis of coordinated effects is not approached with the same scientific rigor.
The gap between theory and practice could not be more evident than in the role played
by maverick firms in the analysis of coordinated effects. This paper addresses the problem of
identifying and modelling maverick-like behaviour. A necessary starting point for this task
is to explain the concept of a maverick firm.
The U.S. Merger guidelines define a maverick firm as ‘. . . one that has a greater economic
incentive to deviate than do most of its rivals and constitutes an unusually disruptive force
in the market place.’ 2 This is not a particularly illuminating definition. Other guidelines
also offer little help in identifying maverick firms. While some guidelines often stress that
mavericks are likely to be small firms3, others stress the unique or atypical characteristics of
maverick firms.4
The New Zealand Merger Guidelines (Section 7.2) is perhaps unique in that it lists market
features that are associated with a maverick firm. These features include, among others: (i)
a history of aggressive, independent pricing behaviour (rather than of following the lead of
other businesses); (ii) a record of innovative behaviour or low costs; (iii) a business having a
substantial amount of excess capacity, particularly if allied with a low market share; and (iv)
a firm having a business model that differs from the industry norm.
2U.S. Merger Guidelines (§ 2.12). Similar definitions can be found in the Australian Merger Guidelines
(5.139), Irish Guidelines (§4.24), UK OFT Guidelines (§4.17), NZ Merger Guidelines (Section 7.2), and EU
Merger Guidelines (§19-21).
3The Australian Merger Guidelines (5.139), for example, specifically refers to small firms: ‘ ... In some
markets the ‘maverick’ behaviour of particular firms, even small firms, serves to undermine attempts to
coordinate the exercise of market power. These firms tend to deliver benefits to consumers beyond their own
immediate supply, by forcing other market participants to deliver better and cheaper products. Alternatively
a small firm may be an innovative new entrant with a new product or process capable of upsetting established
market shares....’ .
4The New Zealand Merger Guidelines (7.2), for example, explicitly lists some characteristics that might
be associated with a maverick firm: ‘...it may have lower costs than other businesses, or is an innovator.
Such businesses can be regarded as vigorous and effective competitors, often referred to as mavericks. The
independent or less predictable behaviour of such a business may be an important source of competition in
the market, and may undermine efforts by other businesses to engage in coordination. The maverick may be
identifiable as an observably disruptive force by, for example, its taking the lead in price wars. Alternatively, it
may perform a less obvious role by refusing to follow, and therefore undermining efforts by rivals to engineer,
price increases. Such a business need not be large to have an impact on competition out of proportion
to its relative market size. Relatively small businesses may have a greater incentive to cheat on collusive
arrangements.’
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A cursory examination of the above-listed items highlights part of the reason for the
disconnect between theory and practice. Standard static oligopoly models are unlikely to
support equilibrium outcomes where firms have substantial excess capacity but a low share
of the market as suggested in (iii). Similarly, aggressive behaviour, as suggested in (i), is
often associated in standard oligopoly models with large rather than small market shares.
Moreover, standard models assume that although firms might be different from each other
(e.g., exhibit different marginal cost or produce slightly different goods and services), they
all choose the same strategic variable (typically either quantity or price) and they do so in
order to maximise profits. However, the characteristics of maverick firms as described by
most merger guidelines suggest deeper asymmetries than those considered by theory. This
indicates that modelling asymmetries appropriately will be an important consideration in
developing a theory of maverick firm behaviour.
Thus, in this paper, we explore a unique database on weekly prices (interest rates) charged
by mortgage providers in Australia from 2003 to 2006. During this period, the Reserve
Bank of Australia (RBA) changed its cash rate five times. This provides us with a natural
experiment — a systemic increase in costs faced by all mortgage providers — to test the
responsiveness of suppliers. In particular, we measure the responsiveness of suppliers both in
terms of price levels and timing of price changes. The aim of this exercise is two-fold. The
first aim is to provide possible practical approaches to identifying maverick behaviour. The
second aim is to inform the development of theory.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the sparse literature on the eco-
nomics of maverick firms. Section 3 briefly documents the significance of maverick firms in
actual merger analysis across different jurisdictions. Section 4 describes in detail the data on
interest rates charged by mortgage providers in Australia. We also propose, in that section,
two measures of maverick-like behaviour and apply them to the mortgage data. Section 5
concludes by discussing the relevance of the empirical results for the development of theory.
2 A Review of the Literature
To the best of our knowledge there are no formal models illustrating the process by which
maverick firms disrupt coordination in an oligopoly setting. Kwoka (1989) is an exception
in that he examines the ex-post profitability of mergers when firms exhibit non-Cournot
conjectures. Under some very specific assumptions about the conjectures of firms–which
are assumed to be exogenous and asymmetric–he argues that the elimination of maverick
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firms can make mergers more profitable by reducing competition post-merger and potentially
leading to greater industry output contraction than that created by mergers under Cournot
conjectures. However, Kwoca does not explicitly model the emergence of such conjectures
and how they might arise in equilibrium. Importantly, he does not examine coordinated
behaviour.
In the absence of formal models of maverick-like behaviour, most commentators seem to
rely on Baker (2002), who is regularly cited by many competition regulators across the globe.
Baker proposes two mechanisms through which a maverick firm can disrupt coordination.
First, mavericks can initiate price wars or heavy discounting. Second, maverick firms may
refuse to raise prices following a price rise by rivals.
This suggests that the very notion of a maverick firm requires it to have a pivotal role in the
market. That is, the behaviour of a maverick firm will presumably spell the difference between
coordination and competition in the market place. Therefore, characterising a maverick firm
will require identifying conditions under which a single firm can make a difference in terms
of the success or failure of coordinated action. Therefore, looking for a maverick is often akin
to identifying market conditions where attempted coordination has failed.
In this spirit, Baker (2002) suggests three possible methods for uncovering mavericks. The
first method involves analysing pricing behaviour. This might involve identifying sellers that
precipitate price-cutting by rivals or that maintain stable prices when rivals initiate price
increases. Alternatively, this might involve identifying providers who consistently offer low
prices. In this paper, we offer two empirical measures of maverick-like behavior that capture
aggressive pricing behaviour both in terms of low prices (relative to the market) and of the
number of price changes.
The second method consists of identifying natural experiments; exogenous changes in
market conditions that affect costs or demand asymmetrically. The idea is that when a
maverick constrains the market price, changes in the maverick’s costs or demand will affect
the market price. However, changes in costs or demand faced by other sellers will not affect
market price. In this paper we do not consider a natural experiment of this type. Instead,
we explore an event that affects (perhaps asymmetrically) all suppliers in the industry; an
increase in the RBA cash rate. Indeed, during the period under consideration, there have
been five increases in the cash rate. This provides us with an opportunity to observe suppliers’
responses to these systemic increase in costs in terms of changes in rates, number of changes
in rates and the response time.
The third method entails an investigation of what Baker refers to as a priori factors
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that might explain why a firm might prefer a lower coordinated price whereas its rivals prefer
higher prices. These factors include: (i) low expansion costs so that returns on the maverick’s
additional sales can be substantial; (ii) substantial excess or divertible capacity so that the
maverick has both the incentive to expand output and the ability to disrupt coordinated
pricing by increasing output; (iii) ability to conceal output expansion since a firm is more
likely to be a maverick if it has an unusual ability to expand its sales without the knowledge
of competitors; and (iv) a short time horizon so that the maverick will attach greater weight
to the short-run price cutting strategy than to the longer-run punishments that rivals might
impose. We do not pursue this third method in this paper as our concern is with developing
metrics of maverick-like behaviour and not with performing a full competition assessment.
As the discussion above makes clear, there is no established understanding or explicit
theory explaining why maverick firms behave in such a way. There is also no formal con-
sideration of the competitive effects of allowing maverick firms to merge with rivals–it is
implicitly assumed that the merger of a firm with a maverick will eliminate an aggressive
competitor from the marketplace. This lack of a solid intellectual basis is neither a new
concern nor the preoccupation solely of economists. Both economics and legal scholars have
manifested these concerns. Largenfeld (p. 49, 1996), for example, states that “. . .Maverick
behavior is often due to management decision making, rather then obvious profit-maximizing
behavior based on market structure, so there may be little certainty that a maverick’s behav-
iour will continue even absent a merger. This analysis also presumably implies that a merger
that does not affect a maverick firm would be less likely to result in collusion — although the
guidelines do not state this explicitly. . . ” .
Similarly, Jacobs (p. 568, 2001) stresses that ‘the problem of the ‘maverick’ firm, or ag-
gressive competitor, inheres in the imprecise terminology used to describe the maverick-in-fact,
the questionable incentives created by denying it the freedom to merge, and the possibilities
created by the Revised Merger Guidelines for imagining a future maverick born entirely from
merger-related efficiencies. At the very least, the maverick concept needs to be expressed more
precisely; at the most its rationale in the Revised Merger Guidelines need to be reconsidered.’
Thus, it is fitting that one of the objectives of our empirical approach is to inform and
stimulate the development of theory that can aid our understanding of the behaviour of
maverick firms and their impact on competition. We will return to this in Section 5.
5
3 The role of maverick firms in practice
The reader at this stage might be wondering whether we are making a storm in a tea cup.
This section puts this concern to rest by informally documenting the increasingly important
role that the notion of maverick firms plays in competition analysis.
Those who are familiar with U.S. competition cases will be familiar with the following
statement by William Kolasky (2002), who at the time was Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice: ‘. . .mavericks are playing an
increasingly important role, figuring prominently in three of our last four cases.’ (Kolasky,
2002, p. 16). In addition, Coate (2006) provides a detailed case study of the FTC merger
review process focused on single market horizontal mergers evaluated between 1993 and 2003.
He examines a total of 124 single-market merger reviews. Of these 124 cases, 56 included
concerns about coordinated effects. Coate then divided these cases into three broad areas
covering alternative collusion theories: (i) structural, (ii) regime shift and (iii) maverick. The
structuralist theory referred to a situation where an already weakened competitive market
was deemed to be at risk of price increases or reinforcement of the collusive structure of the
market as a result of the merger. The regime shift theory covered situations where mergers
transform a competitive market into a collusive one. Finally, the maverick theory referred to
circumstances under which one of the merging parties is a firm whose actions maintained a
competitive pre-merger market and that following the consummation of the transaction will
no longer exercise such constraint as it will exit the market.
Importantly, maverick theories accounted for 18% of the cases; a total of 10 cases. More-
over, while the rate of enforcement to closing a case was 9 to 1 for cases involving a maverick
theory, such rates were considerably lower for the other theories; 6 to 1 for cases involving
structuralist theories and 12 to 27 for cases involving regime shift theories. This clearly
demonstrates the importance of theories regarding maverick-like behaviour by firms for US
merger practice.
Although there are no similar systematic studies of the role played by the concept of
maverick firms in case law in other countries, the existence of mavericks clearly raises a red
flag when U.K. competition authorities analyse mergers. This is illustrated by the acquisition
of Linpac Containers by DS Smith. DS Smith is an international firm involved in the paper
and corrugated packaging, plastic packaging, office products wholesaling, and office products
manufacturing sectors. Linpac Containers is involved primarily in the supply of corrugated
paper packaging. In its referral of the case to the U.K. Competition Commission, the Office of
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Fair Trade highlighted the perception of customers that ‘LINPAC Containers might perform
the role of a maverick in the market, whose removal has affected their ability to negotiate’.5
The U.K. Competition Commission6, when investigating the merger, considered the ar-
gument that Linpac was a maverick. However, customers’ responses to their questionnaires
suggested that Linpac had behaved in a similar manner to the other major suppliers, and
did not appear to be a more aggressive competitor on price or other factors. This conclusion
was supported by an examination of Linpac’s pricing behavior, which was shown to be in line
with DS Smith’s over the previous years. Moreover, although Linpac had resisted a November
2003 price rise, other companies also resisted the price rise. In particular, the Commission
did not find that Linpac’s ‘market share understated its impact on the competitive process.’ 7
Similarly, maverick-like considerations are important in Australia as illustrated by the
following two recent cases. On July 2006, the Australian Competition and Consumer Com-
mission (ACCC) announced its opposition to the acquisition of Wattyl by Barloworld limited.
Barloworld is the third-largest supplier of architectural and decorative paints in Australia.
Wattyl is Australia’s second-largest architectural and decorative paint supplier. A particu-
lar concern of the ACCC in opposing the merger was that Solver (one of Wattyl’s brands)
‘...is the industry maverick in the trade segment with a strategy of using price as the primary
means by which to expand sales against Barloworld and Orica.’ 8
On March 2007, the ACCC announced its decision not to oppose the acquisition of Good
Stuff Bakery by George Weston Foods. George Weston is a national manufacturer and dis-
tributor of a range of consumer food products and ingredients. Its baking business includes
the manufacturing and distribution of a range of breads and other baked goods. Good Stuff
Bakery (covering the southern part of Queensland and northern New South Wales) manufac-
tures and distributes assorted bread products. A particular concern of the ACCC was that
the proposed acquisition would remove a maverick supplier of ‘price fighting’ bread (i.e., plain
white, wholemeal and multigrain breads sold under brands that are not heavily marketed).
However, the ACCC concluded that ‘any reduced competition in the supply of price-fighting
bread that could be reasonably attributable to the Proposed Acquisition, was unlikely to con-
5Office of Fair Trading, 20 May 2004.
6U.K. Competition Commission, A report on the completed acquisition of Linpac containers Ltd by DS
Smith Plc.
7U.K. Competition Commission, op. cit., p. 32.
8ACCC’s Public Competition Assessment, 11 August 2006. Orica is Australia’s largest supplier of archi-
tectural and decorative paints.
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stitute a substantial lessening of competition across the Relevant Bread Market.’ 9
In summary, this section has shown that despite the lack of a solid foundation, the concept
of a maverick firm is an important component of merger analysis across the globe. Therefore,
developing a better understanding of how to operationalise this concept, which is the aim of
the next section, has the potential to greatly influence merger case law and policy.
4 Mortgage Providers in Australia: Our Empirical Approach
Cannex has kindly provided us with 31,641 weekly observations on 9 different rates from 06
January 2003 to 23 October 2006. This includes data from all mortgage providers (159 in
total) in Australia for which Cannex collects data. There are 199 observations (on these 199
dates) for each provider although not all providers offer all possible rates. In this paper we
concentrate on the standard or ordinary variable rate. This is a standard (and very popular)
mortgage product in Australia that often attracts a lower rate than other products and it
includes extra features such as internet and ATM access and a limited number of withdrawals.
The average ordinary variable rate for the period under consideration was 6.879%. It is
important to note that the data contains only price and not quantity observations.
In order to remove the effect of providers who were only present for a small portion of
the sample period, we only keep those providers for whom there is an ordinary variable rate
for at least 2 years (104 weeks) worth of data. This reduced sample contains 122 mortgage
providers and 23,297 weekly observations across these providers. Of the 122 providers in the
sample, 103 of them have a price provided for all 199 weeks in the sample. The first column of
Table 4 indicates which providers were not present during the entire sample period. Our first
measure of maverick behaviour is unaffected by the length of time that a provider appears in
the sample, whereas for our second measure, treatment of those providers with some missing
data during the 199 weeks affects the measure. We discuss this below.
There were five RBA cash rate changes during the sample period (all upwards). As
discussed above, these five changes will be an important element of one of our measures of
maverick-like behaviour. The table shows the dates of these changes, the change in cash rate
and the new rates.
Table 1: Changes in the RBA cash rate
9ACCC’s Public Competition Assessment, 16 March 2007. The Relevant Bread Market included other
bread products such as heavily branded and market products.
8
Release date Change in cash rate New cash rate target
5 Nov 2003 +0.25% 5.00%
3 Dec 2003 +0.25% 5.25%
2 Mar 2005 +0.25% 5.50%
3 May 2006 +0.25% 5.75%
2 Aug 2006 +0.25% 6.00%
Figure 1 below depicts the cash rate, the average of the rates charged by three of the
largest banks in Australia (Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA), National Australia
Bank (NAB) and Westpac (WSBL))10, and the average rate charged by the remaining sup-
pliers. A perfunctory examination of the figure below reveals two distinct features. First,
there is a clear distinction between the rates charged by the three large banks and the remain-
ing suppliers. Second, there is more variability over time in the rates charged by the latter
group of suppliers than that charged by the former group of suppliers. The two measures of
maverick-like behaviour that we propose explore these two features of the data.
Before expostulating our two measures, it is worthwhile highlighting some of the short-
comings of our empirical approach. First, there is an implicit assumption that this mortgage
product (standard ordinary rate) is reasonably homogenous across suppliers. For example,
most providers will include features such as 100% Redraw Offset account with cheque book
and ATM facility, Internet and Telephone banking, and ATM and EFTPOS access. However,
there are likely to be differences across providers. Similarly, different providers might charge
different fees. Finally, the nature of competition might be such that some suppliers might
offer mortgages as a package (and also as a stand alone product) which include other prod-
ucts such as insurance, credit cards and savings and checking accounts. We argue, however,
that our estimates might be thought of as an upper bound on consumers’ valuation for the
one-stop shop convenience of bundles or on the differences between fees or on the degree of
heterogeneity of the products. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that our empirical approach is
perhaps best thought of as a fact-finding exercise that aims at generating more research on
this important topic.
10 In Australia, these three banks together with ANZ Bank (ANZ) are sometimes referred to as the ‘big four.’
As we will see in the regression analysis below and in Table 6, the ANZ pricing behaviour from mid-2005 is
quite different from the other three large banks and thus we treat it separately in this figure.
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4.1 Measure 1: Deviation from Estimated Average
Our first measure is a simple comparison between the rate which a bank offers and the average
rate across all providers. The average rate across all providers is calculated at each point
in time using all providers with a non-missing ordinary variable rate. The measure for each
bank is just the coefficient on a dummy variable for that bank in a regression of average
ordinary variable rate against a set of dummies for every bank in the sample.
The coefficient can be interpreted as the average difference from the mean rate for each
provider after controlling for variation across time. Graphically, the coefficient can be seen as
the average integral of the area between the provider’s rate and the average rate. Therefore,
a negative coefficient indicates that, for that particular rate, the provider is charging a rate
that is less than the average rate. Of course, the more negative a firm’s coefficient is, the
more aggressive is the firm’s pricing behaviour (on average). This makes the firm a more
likely candidate for being identified as a maverick.
We use the resulting coefficients from this regression as an index of how much that
provider, on average, differs from the standard price for that product (as represented in
this case by the average over all providers at each point in time). Table 2 summarises our
results and exhibits the ranking of providers according to this measure. Three providers have
rates which are not significantly different than the average: ANZ Bank, Heritage Building
Society (HBS), and Defence Force Credit Union (DFCU). These providers are in italics in
Table 2. 49 providers have rates which are significantly lower than the average. 70 providers
have rates which are significantly higher than the average. The dispersion of rates is larger for
the more competitive providers (negative coefficients) than for the less competitive providers,
many of whom are clustered around the Commonwealth Bank, Westpac, and National Aus-
tralia Bank averages. These three large banks have an average ordinary variable rate that is
.24 percentage points higher than the average ordinary variable rate across all providers.
The differences are economically, as well as statistically, significant. Comparing the three
big banks to the average (or to ANZ bank), if a customer took an average ordinary variable
rate loan from one of the big three banks, she would be paying $592 per year more for her
loan and a total of $17,500 more over the life of the loan (for a typical 30-year loan calculated
at the average interest rate over the sample of 6.88%.).
Table 2 about here
Comparing the most competitive provider, Assured Home Loans (ASHL), to the big three,
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a customer with ASHL would pay over $2,600 less per year on the loan. Over the life of a
typical 30-year loan, the customer would be paying almost $80,000 less with ASHL than with
one of the big three banks.
4.2 Measure 2: Providers’ responsiveness
Our second measure attempts to utilise the time dimension of interest rate changes and the
number of changes in rates to provide an alternative metric to gauge maverick-like behaviour.
In the context of mortgages, what might constitute maverick behaviour? With our first
measure, we capture the overall pricing approach of the provider relative to the industry
average. But maverick behaviour, as discussed above, might also be construed as behaving
differently than the ‘normal’ firm. In this context, looking at how firms respond to changes
in the RBA cash rate gives a way to compare different firms. The big three banks, as seen
in Figure 1, respond in unison to RBA changes and in all cases respond within two weeks by
raising their own rates. The big three do not lower their rates at any point in the sample,
in keeping with the lack of any drop in the RBA cash rate during the sample period. Some
other providers do lower their rate occasionally, even though the cash rate has not changed.
Other providers increase rates more frequently than the RBA increases the cash rate.
Our second measure will attempt to combine all of these aspects—responses to the ‘market’
as represented by the RBA cash rate and ‘unprovoked’ price increases and decreases—into one
measure of maverick behaviour. We incorporate a time dimension by looking at the length
of time the provider waits before increasing/decreasing the rate in response to RBA rate
changes. Our ranking is formed by
ri =I+RBA,i ∗ wI,i −D
+
RBA,i ∗ wD,i + I
−
RBA,i ∗ w
(.9)
I −D
−
RBA,i ∗ w
(.9)
D
k1Dii ∗ w
(.9)
D − k2I
i
i ∗ w
(.9)
I
where
• I+RBA,i is the number of increases by the provider in response to an increase in the
reserve bank cash rate
• wI,i is the average amount of time, in weeks, that a provider waits (in our data) to
react to an increase in the reserve bank cash rate
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• I−RBA,i is the number of times the provider ignored increases in the reserve bank cash
rate
• These are weighted by w(.9)I , the 90th percentile of the distribution (over all providers) of
average waiting times to increase rates in response to a reserve bank cash rate increase.
• Iii are rate increases initiated by the provider which are not in response to any reserve
bank increase
The variables for decreases, D+RBA,i, D
−
RBA,i, and D
i
i and associated waiting times are
defined analogously.
Notice that every time a firm fails to respond to an increase in the cash rate, the spell of
non-response is right-censored in our data. Either the spell lasts until another RBA change
in the rate or we reach the end of the data period. There is no way to tell in the data how
long a spell might have lasted in the absence of either of these events. We deal with this
problem by weighting non-responses by an arbitrary ‘waiting time.’ In the results presented
here we use the 90th percentile of the distribution of all waiting times, across all firms, from
a RBA cash rate change to a change in the firm’s rate. We also re-calculated the ratings
using the maximum waiting time instead of the 90th percentile and the overall results were
not sensitive to this change.
Increases and decreases which are initiated by the provider and not related to any change
in the RBA cash rate (Iii and D
i
i) are also weighted by this same ‘waiting time’. k1 and k2
could be set to one if we wanted to give provider-initiated changes the same weight as changes
in response to changes initiated by the RBA. Looking at the data, these provider-initiated
changes tend to be smaller in magnitude than the responses to RBA changes. Decreases are
79% the size of increases in response to RBA changes and non-RBA induced increases are
60% the size of increases in response to RBA changes, so we set k1 = .79 and k2 = .6. We
also calculated the ratings by arbitrarily setting k1 = k2 = 12 and the overall results are much
the same.
The rating is defined such that a provider which always responds immediately to any
increase or decrease in the cash rate and never makes any other changes will have a rating
of zero. Positive ratings are ‘better’ than this benchmark, and negative ratings are ‘worse’.
Therefore, the higher the rating of a firm, the more likely this firm is of being identified as a
maverick.
Table 3 provides information on the total number of rate changes, across all providers,
and the average magnitude of the various rate changes.
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Table 3 about here
For 19 providers rate data is not available for all 199 weeks but only for a subset of the
full sample period. For these providers, we assumed that their rating over the missing weeks
of data was zero. In other words, we interpolate the rates over the missing period assuming
that the provider responded immediately to any RBA cash rate changes and made no other
rate increases or decreases. This will tend to bias the ranking for these providers towards
zero. However, this is the most reasonable assumption that we can make about the missing
data. Since this problem only affects a small proportion of the total number of providers and
since these assumptions do not in any way affect the rating of the providers which are in the
sample for the entire period, we are confident in the results.
Table 4 about here
Table 4 reports the results of applying our second measure. The average is 7.2 and the
median is 5.0. There are 41 providers with an above-average rating while 81 providers have
a below average rating. Again, as with the first measure, the dispersion is greater amongst
the more competitive providers. The correlation between the two measures is 20%, with the
same provider topping the two rankings (ASHL - Assured Home Loans).
One drawback of this measure is that small and large price changes are treated the same.
So a firm which raises its rate .5 in response to an RBA increase of .5 will have a better
rating than a firm which raises it’s price by .25 in response to the same RBA increase and
then implements a second increase of .25 a few weeks later. Thus, we believe that the two
measures should be looked at together.
4.3 A Composite Measure
We also think consumers — and therefore the ability of maverick firms to disrupt coordination
— are likely to care independently about the two measures. Consumers obviously care that
the rate which they pay, on average, is low. This is captured by the first measure. But
consumers also care about uncertainty and the risk that the mortgage provider will change
the variable rate even in the absence of an RBA rate change. So providers who might have
a low average rate, but do poorly on the second measure, might be viewed as risky from
the point of view of consumers interested in minimizing ‘surprise’ rate increases. Table 4
includes the information that goes into our ranking for this second measure. One could
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also construct volatility measures looking at the total number of changes from the third and
fourth columns. Or, one could create other types of indices from the individual elements of
this measure. We do not present these here as we view our combination of these individual
elements as informative about competition in the mortgage industry. For other industries or
analyses, one might prefer indices constructed from one or more of the individual components
of Table 4.
Table 5 presents a composite measure which combines the two measures. We take each
measure and transform it by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation.
This has the effect of putting them on a common scale. We then sum these two measures
(taking the additive inverse of the first measure so that positive numbers represent more
maverick-like behaviour for both scales) to create the composite score. These results are
presented in Table 5.
Table 5 about here
4.4 A Closer Look at the data
We now look more closely at the behaviour of a selected number of players in terms of our
measures of maverick-like behaviour. Tables 6 and 7 provide information on all rate changes
for five large Australian banks and five smaller providers. For the five small providers, we
choose the two that perform best in our composite ranking (Assured Home Loans (ASHL) and
Commonwealth Bank of Australia Online Only (CBOA)), the two that perform worst in our
composite ranking (LaTrobe Financial Services (LHL) and Unicom Credit Union (TUCU)),
and Aussie Home Loans (AHL) who arguably market themselves as a maverick provider.
Tables 6 and 7 about here
The first thing we note is that the five large banks all behave roughly similarly. There is
very little movement in the interest rate and usually only in response to RBA changes. Such
changes are followed quickly (within two weeks) by the large banks.
The smaller providers have much more frequent interest rate movements and the timing
of such movements often appears disconnected to RBA changes. ASHL ignore the two
interest rate increases of the RBA in 2003, but then have a large one-off increase of .74 in
late 2004. After that point, ASHL appears to follow RBA changes much as the large banks
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do. Aussie Home Loans follows the two RBA changes quite quickly in 2003 but only makes
a small adjustment in response to the first RBA increase in 2005. A later adjustment, after
five months have passed, makes up the remaining gap to the RBA change of .25. AHL then
makes two reductions to their standard rate in October but these discounts only last for a
month, as they are reversed with a large increase in November, 2005. It would be interesting
to see if the decreases in October were linked to any particular marketing campaign to attract
new customers.
Unicom Credit Union (TUCU) starts with a rate which is well above the market average
(see Table 8). It ignores two RBA rate increases, and then makes a large downwards
adjustment in late 2004. This brings TUCU roughly in line with the big banks, a position
which it keeps by responding to each RBA rate increase in the second half of our sample
period. LaTrobe Financial Services (LHL), our second worst-performing provider on the
composite scale, has a higher interest rate than the main banks, responds to almost all of the
RBA changes and also has two additional changes in January, 2004 and April, 2005 which
do not seem to be in response to any particular actions by the Reserve Bank.
Table 8 provides the initial interest rate and ending interest rate for the 10 providers from
Tables 6 and 7.
Table 8 about here
What comes through clearly in Tables 6 through 8 is the importance of the time dimension
in any discussion of maverick behaviour. Furthermore, maverick behaviour may take place
for some periods of time and not others. Does AHL’s deep, but fleeting discounting in
October, 2005 merit the maverick label? ASHL has below-average interest rates throughout
the sample period. Their reactions to RBA increases are distinguishable from those of the
big banks in the first part of the sample, but not in the second. TUCU fairs poorly in our
measure because of the initial high interest rate which prevails for almost the first half of our
sample. In the second half, they look not much different than the big banks both in level of
interest rate and in their response to RBA increases.
4.5 Summary of Results
In this section we presented the results of our two proposed measures of maverick-like be-
haviour. Although there is a positive correlation between the two measures, we suggest that
competition regulators are likely going to look at both pricing and timing dimensions. A
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closer look at the measures for a selected number of providers suggests that maverick-like
behaviour is unlikely to last for long periods of time; maverick behaviour may take place
for some periods of time and not others. This raises an important potential problem for
competition authorities as it suggests that looking at a particular point in time might not be
enough to come to a view about whether or not a particular firm is a maverick.
5 Discussion
Our empirical approach has several important implications for the development of theory.
First, the empirical results above strongly suggest that static oligopoly models will have little
to say about maverick-like behaviour. Clearly the time dimension — e.g., how long it takes
competitors to raise their prices following a systemic increase in costs — is an important
component in the strategy toolkit of competitors and an important element of the ability
of a firm to disrupt coordinated behaviour. This, however, does not imply that infinitely
repeated games, with the same static game played infinitely many times over time and when
firms make their choices simultaneously, represent the way forward. Quite to the contrary,
the empirical analysis above demonstrates that the choice of when to reduce (or increase)
prices is a clear strategic consideration.
Second, it is unlikely that useful models to understand maverick-like behaviour will be
symmetric. Standard oligopoly models typically consider asymmetries in terms of product
differentiation (but preserve symmetric costs and strategies) or in terms of costs (but preserve
symmetry in terms of demand and strategies). The empirical approach developed in this paper
suggests that firms are asymmetric in a more fundamental way. Different mortgage providers
clearly make different choices in the price-time dimension nexus. Some mortgage providers
are very aggressive on the price dimension but not as aggressive on the time dimension and
vice versa. This highlights the need for analysts to pay careful attention to institutions and
market dynamics in their choices of how to model asymmetries.
Third, a theory of maverick behaviour will need to explain how a merger involving a mav-
erick might either change regime or reinforce current equilibrium paying particular attention
to the different dimensions of competition. The degree of heterogeneity in behaviour that was
picked up in the empirical analysis above suggests that it is unlikely that a general theory can
be developed and rather that a case-by-case approach is a more sensible avenue to explore.
In conclusion, despite the lack of theoretical foundations, the narrative of Section 3 has
clearly demonstrated that the notion of a maverick firm plays an important role in competition
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analysis. Therefore, the development of techniques to identify maverick firms — and this is the
focus of this paper — is likely to be helpful in competition policy and case law. This empirical
approach, however, is not sufficient. Ultimately this effort needs to be two-pronged; it should
involve both theory and empirical techniques. The theory, however, has to move away from
static symmetric oligopoly models and into dynamic asymmetric models that are informed
by institutions and actual market dynamics.
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Table 2: Rankings of providers
Ordinary variable rate (1-45).
Provider
Ordinary
Variable Rate
(Relative to
average)
Ranking
ASHL -0.88 1
RATE -0.77 2
NWMC -0.66 3
PATH -0.66 4
HLS -0.62 5
HIBN -0.56 6
MOBR -0.56 7
SMS -0.54 8
RHC -0.41 9
CBOA -0.36 10
WIMC -0.35 11
RGM -0.33 12
MEQ -0.32 13
SUCU -0.32 14
LTCC -0.31 15
CIRC -0.31 16
QPC -0.3 17
APIL -0.29 18
ECH -0.29 19
MERM -0.29 20
MRM -0.27 21
SWB -0.26 22
MOA -0.24 23
AIMS -0.23 24
SIRO -0.22 25
SEEC -0.22 26
WSWA -0.21 27
LOGR -0.21 28
QRCU -0.2 29
AUMC -0.2 30
SLCO -0.19 31
WAHL -0.18 32
CIT -0.17 33
YHL -0.17 34
MACL -0.13 35
SCUL -0.13 36
COSE -0.12 37
BCCU -0.12 38
PMC -0.11 39
SAPS -0.11 40
NML -0.09 41
TAFE -0.09 42
BCHL -0.09 43
QSCU -0.08 44
FCU -0.08 45
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Table 2 (continued): Rankings of providers
Ordinary variable rate (51-90)
Provider
Ordinary
Variable Rate
(Relative to
average)
Ranking
AMO -0.06 46
MUSA -0.06 47
BMC -0.04 48
INTC -0.03 49
HBS -0.01 50
ANZ -0.01 51
DFCU 0 52
NPB 0.02 53
PCUN 0.03 54
AUSV 0.03 55
CUA 0.04 56
UHCU 0.04 57
OMCU 0.05 58
QPS 0.05 59
CAPQ 0.06 60
AHL 0.07 61
PCSA 0.08 62
ROTH 0.09 63
UNIW 0.1 64
CDCC 0.1 65
ARMN 0.11 66
MMBS 0.12 67
HUME 0.12 68
VTU 0.12 69
GNP 0.12 70
BANN 0.13 71
ROCK 0.13 72
RAMS 0.13 73
HKB 0.15 74
BASS 0.15 75
NFST 0.15 76
HCU 0.15 77
NACO 0.16 78
NSWT 0.17 79
RICH 0.17 80
LMCU 0.17 81
WMCU 0.17 82
FSCU 0.17 83
ONE 0.19 84
UNCO 0.19 85
WCU 0.2 86
SBS 0.2 87
RTAN 0.2 88
TRAN 0.21 89
ELCU 0.21 90
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Table 2 (continued): Rankings of providers
Ordinary variable rate (91-122).
Provider
Ordinary
Variable Rate
(Relative to
average)
Ranking
MWCU 0.21 91
PACC 0.21 92
ICU 0.22 93
ABAL 0.22 94
CPS 0.22 95
QPCU 0.22 96
UCU 0.23 97
SGE 0.23 98
PSCU 0.23 99
SUMW 0.23 100
ACC 0.23 101
SGBS 0.23 102
CHS 0.23 103
PNCS 0.24 104
COG 0.24 105
QTCU 0.24 106
IMB 0.24 107
BKQ 0.24 108
HOME 0.24 109
WSBL 0.24 110
TIO 0.24 111
HSL 0.24 112
NAB 0.24 113
CBA 0.24 114
SBN 0.24 115
RIWA 0.24 116
UNI 0.25 117
BBS 0.26 118
SSCU 0.27 119
LHL 0.28 120
NECU 0.39 121
TUCU 0.78 122
Entries in italics are not significantly different than zero.
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Table 3: Total number and types of interest rate changes
Ordinary Variable rate
Type of change
Total
Number
Average
Decreases 97 -0.26
All increases 629 0.35
Increases in
response to RBA
changes
579 0.36
All other increases
(not in response
to RBA changes)
50 0.20
Table 4: Ordinary variable rate rankings (1-41)
Provider
Data
code
#
Decr
#
Incr
# Incr in
response
to RBA
Avg
weeks
to Incr
# Incr
by RBA
ignored
Other
Incr
Rating Ranking
ASHL F199 1 4 4 12 1 0 52.68 1
FSCU F199 0 4 4 6 1 0 27 2
QRCU F199 1 5 5 4.6 0 0 24.68 3
WSWA F199 1 5 5 4.6 0 0 24.68 4
OMCU F199 1 5 4 5.5 1 1 24.32 5
CBOA F199 0 5 5 4.6 0 0 23 6
TAFE F199 1 4 4 3.75 1 0 19.68 7
ROTH F199 0 3 3 3.67 2 0 17 8
RTAN F199 0 5 5 3.4 0 0 17 9
CUA F199 1 5 5 2.6 0 0 14.68 10
UHCU F199 0 5 4 3.5 1 1 14.64 11
PCSA F199 1 5 4 3 1 1 14.32 12
CDCC F199 0 4 4 2.75 1 0 14 13
LMCU F199 0 3 3 2.67 2 0 14 14
AUSV Fb 1 5 5 2.4 0 0 13.68 15
QPC F199 0 5 4 3.25 1 1 13.64 16
RGM F199 3 4 4 1.25 1 0 13.04 17
MACL F199 1 5 5 2.2 0 0 12.68 18
SUCU F199 1 5 5 2.2 0 0 12.68 19
ELCU F199 0 5 5 2.4 0 0 12 20
NPB F199 1 6 4 3 1 2 11.96 21
FCU F199 1 3 3 1.33 2 0 11.68 22
MWCU Fb 1 5 5 2 0 0 11.68 23
NSWT F199 1 5 5 2 0 0 11.68 24
BMC F199 3 5 5 1.2 0 0 11.04 25
BBS F199 0 5 5 2.2 0 0 11 26
PSCU F199 0 5 5 2.2 0 0 11 27
QPS F199 1 5 5 1.8 0 0 10.68 28
TUCU F199 1 3 3 1 2 0 10.68 29
SAPS F199 3 5 5 1 0 0 10.04 30
BCCU Fm 1 3 3 0.67 2 0 9.68 31
HCU F199 1 5 5 1.6 0 0 9.68 32
MUSA F199 1 5 5 1.6 0 0 9.68 33
INTC F199 0 4 3 2 2 1 9.64 34
ACC F199 0 5 5 1.8 0 0 9 35
TRAN F199 0 5 5 1.8 0 0 9 36
CIRC Fb 0 6 5 2.2 0 1 8.64 37
ARMN F199 0 5 5 1.6 0 0 8 38
UNIW F199 0 4 4 1.25 1 0 8 39
WCU Fb 0 3 3 0.67 2 0 8 40
MRM F199 6 6 5 0 0 1 7.71 41
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Table 4 (continued): Ordinary variable rate rankings (42-89)
Provider
Data
code
#
Decr
#
Incr
# Incr in
response
to RBA
Avg
weeks
to Incr
# Incr
by RBA
ignored
Other
Incr
Rating Ranking
SCUL Fb 2 5 5 0.8 0 0 7.36 42
CHS F199 0 5 5 1.4 0 0 7 43
DFCU Fm 0 5 5 1.4 0 0 7 44
HBS F199 0 5 5 1.4 0 0 7 45
BASS F199 1 5 5 1 0 0 6.68 46
CAPQ F199 1 4 4 0.5 1 0 6.68 47
NACO F199 1 5 5 1 0 0 6.68 48
PMC F199 3 6 5 0.8 0 1 6.68 49
SSCU F199 1 5 5 1 0 0 6.68 50
MOBR F199 2 7 5 1.6 0 2 6.64 51
SIRO F199 2 4 4 0 1 0 6.36 52
LOGR F199 0 5 5 1.2 0 0 6 53
NML F199 0 5 5 1.2 0 0 6 54
PACC Fm 0 5 5 1.2 0 0 6 55
RICH F199 0 5 5 1.2 0 0 6 56
SGE F199 0 5 5 1.2 0 0 6 57
SWB F199 0 5 5 1.2 0 0 6 58
RHC F199 1 5 5 0.8 0 0 5.68 59
ECH Fm 0 6 5 1.6 0 1 5.64 60
CIT F199 3 5 5 0 0 0 5.04 61
AMO F199 0 4 4 0.5 1 0 5 62
BANN Fb 2 6 5 0.8 0 1 5 63
COG F199 0 5 5 1 0 0 5 64
ICU F199 0 5 5 1 0 0 5 65
LTCC F199 2 6 5 0.8 0 1 5 66
NECU Fb 0 5 5 1 0 0 5 67
PCUN F199 0 5 5 1 0 0 5 68
QTCU F199 0 5 5 1 0 0 5 69
UCU F199 0 5 5 1 0 0 5 70
WMCU F199 0 5 5 1 0 0 5 71
VTU F199 0 6 5 1.4 0 1 4.64 72
YHL F199 2 7 5 1.2 0 2 4.64 73
RATE Fb 2 5 5 0.2 0 0 4.36 74
SBS F199 2 5 5 0.2 0 0 4.36 75
ABAL F199 0 5 5 0.8 0 0 4 76
AIMS F199 2 6 5 0.6 0 1 4 77
AUMC F199 2 6 5 0.6 0 1 4 78
HKB F199 0 5 5 0.8 0 0 4 79
IMB F199 0 5 5 0.8 0 0 4 80
MMBS F199 0 5 5 0.8 0 0 4 81
PNCS F199 0 5 5 0.8 0 0 4 82
SEEC F199 1 6 4 1 1 2 3.96 83
ANZ F199 1 5 5 0.4 0 0 3.68 84
HIBN F199 3 6 5 0.2 0 1 3.68 85
MERM F199 2 5 5 0 0 0 3.36 86
BCHL F199 1 6 5 0.8 0 1 3.32 87
NFST Fb 1 6 5 0.8 0 1 3.32 88
NWMC F199 1 6 5 0.8 0 1 3.32 89
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Table 4 (continued): Ordinary variable rate rankings (90-122)
Provider
Data
code
#
Decr
#
Incr
# Incr in
response
to RBA
Avg
weeks
to Incr
# Incr
by RBA
ignored
Other
Incr
Rating Ranking
BKQ F199 0 5 5 0.6 0 0 3 90
HOME F199 0 5 5 0.6 0 0 3 91
HUME F199 0 5 5 0.6 0 0 3 92
QSCU F199 0 4 4 0 1 0 3 93
WSBL F199 0 5 5 0.6 0 0 3 94
RAMS F199 3 6 5 0 0 1 2.68 95
AHL F199 2 7 5 0.8 0 2 2.64 96
MEQ Fb 0 6 5 1 0 1 2.64 97
SUMW F199 2 7 5 0.8 0 2 2.64 98
CPS F199 0 5 5 0.4 0 0 2 99
HSL F199 0 5 5 0.4 0 0 2 100
MOA F199 0 5 5 0.4 0 0 2 101
SMS Fb 2 6 5 0.2 0 1 2 102
TIO Fb 0 5 5 0.4 0 0 2 103
UNCO F199 0 5 5 0.4 0 0 2 104
UNI Fb 0 5 5 0.4 0 0 2 105
WIMC F199 1 5 5 0 0 0 1.68 106
COSE F199 4 8 5 0.4 0 3 1.63 107
CBA F199 0 5 5 0.2 0 0 1 108
GNP F199 0 5 5 0.2 0 0 1 109
SBN F199 0 5 5 0.2 0 0 1 110
PATH F199 0 6 5 0.6 0 1 0.64 111
SLCO Fb 0 6 5 0.6 0 1 0.64 112
APIL F199 1 6 5 0.2 0 1 0.32 113
SGBS F199 1 6 5 0.2 0 1 0.32 114
NAB F199 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 115
RIWA F199 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 116
HLS Fb 2 7 5 0.2 0 2 -0.36 117
QPCU F199 0 6 5 0.4 0 1 -0.36 118
WAHL F199 4 8 5 0 0 3 -0.37 119
ONE F199 0 6 5 0.2 0 1 -1.36 120
ROCK F199 0 6 5 0.2 0 1 -1.36 121
LHL F199 0 6 4 0 1 2 -1.72 122
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Table 5: Composite rankings (1-41)
Provider
Ranking
based upon
average
rate differ-
ence
Ranking
based upon
interest
rate move-
ments
Composite
Score
Ranking
ASHL 1 1 9.67 1
CBOA 10 6 3.55 2
WSWA 27 3 3.23 3
QRCU 29 4 3.19 4
RATE 2 74 2.45 5
OMCU 58 5 2.21 6
FSCU 79 2 2.14 7
TAFE 41 7 2.08 8
RGM 12 17 2.04 9
QPC 17 16 2.01 10
MOBR 6 51 1.99 11
SUCU 13 18 1.95 12
NWMC 3 87 1.90 13
HIBN 7 84 1.57 14
PATH 4 111 1.52 15
CIRC 15 37 1.34 16
RHC 9 59 1.30 17
SMS 8 99 1.26 18
MACL 35 19 1.24 19
HLS 5 117 1.23 20
MRM 21 41 1.06 21
ROTH 63 8 1.03 22
FCU 44 22 0.92 23
CUA 56 10 0.89 24
UHCU 57 11 0.89 25
ECH 18 60 0.85 26
LTCC 16 62 0.83 27
SAPS 39 30 0.80 28
AUSV 54 15 0.79 29
SWB 22 53 0.79 30
BCCU 37 31 0.78 31
PCSA 62 12 0.69 32
SIRO 25 52 0.69 33
BMC 48 25 0.68 34
RTAN 86 9 0.62 35
LOGR 28 54 0.60 36
NPB 53 21 0.58 37
CDCC 64 13 0.57 38
MUSA 46 32 0.56 39
MEQ 14 96 0.53 40
MERM 19 86 0.52 41
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Table 5 (continued): Composite rankings (42-89)
Provider
Ranking
based upon
average
rate differ-
ence
Ranking
based upon
interest
rate move-
ments
Composite
Score
Ranking
WIMC 11 106 0.51 42
SCUL 36 42 0.49 43
INTC 49 34 0.44 44
AIMS 24 76 0.39 45
SEEC 26 83 0.35 46
PMC 40 46 0.32 47
CIT 33 61 0.31 48
LMCU 80 14 0.31 49
QPS 59 28 0.29 50
AUMC 30 77 0.28 51
YHL 34 72 0.26 52
NML 42 55 0.15 53
MOA 23 100 0.15 54
APIL 20 113 0.10 55
HBS 50 43 0.00 56
NSWT 81 23 -0.01 57
DFCU 52 44 -0.04 58
AMO 47 63 -0.10 59
ELCU 89 20 -0.12 60
MWCU 90 24 -0.16 61
HCU 74 33 -0.22 62
BCHL 43 88 -0.23 63
SLCO 31 112 -0.23 64
UNIW 65 38 -0.27 65
QSCU 45 90 -0.31 66
CAPQ 60 47 -0.31 67
ARMN 66 39 -0.31 68
PSCU 97 26 -0.33 69
COSE 38 107 -0.35 70
WAHL 32 119 -0.41 71
PCUN 55 64 -0.43 72
BBS 118 27 -0.45 73
ANZ 51 85 -0.47 74
TRAN 91 35 -0.54 75
ACC 98 36 -0.62 76
BASS 75 48 -0.64 77
WCU 87 40 -0.64 78
NACO 78 49 -0.68 79
BANN 71 65 -0.81 80
RICH 82 56 -0.81 81
VTU 67 73 -0.82 82
CHS 99 45 -0.90 83
MMBS 68 78 -0.91 84
AHL 61 97 -0.92 85
WMCU 83 66 -0.96 86
PACC 92 57 -0.96 87
HKB 76 79 -1.02 88
SGE 100 58 -1.04 89
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Table 5 (continued): Composite rankings (90-122)
Provider
Ranking
based upon
average
rate differ-
ence
Ranking
based upon
interest
rate move-
ments
Composite
Score
Ranking
HUME 69 91 -1.05 90
SSCU 119 50 -1.09 91
NFST 77 89 -1.12 92
RAMS 72 95 -1.13 93
ICU 93 67 -1.14 94
SBS 88 75 -1.16 95
UCU 101 68 -1.18 96
COG 104 69 -1.22 97
QTCU 105 70 -1.22 98
ABAL 94 80 -1.28 99
GNP 70 108 -1.33 100
IMB 106 81 -1.36 101
PNCS 107 82 -1.36 102
UNCO 84 101 -1.45 103
BKQ 108 92 -1.50 104
HOME 109 93 -1.50 105
WSBL 110 94 -1.50 106
SUMW 102 98 -1.51 107
CPS 95 102 -1.56 108
HSL 111 103 -1.64 109
TIO 112 104 -1.64 110
UNI 117 105 -1.68 111
ROCK 73 120 -1.70 112
NECU 121 71 -1.77 113
CBA 113 109 -1.78 114
SBN 114 110 -1.78 115
SGBS 103 114 -1.84 116
QPCU 96 118 -1.90 117
NAB 115 115 -1.92 118
RIWA 116 116 -1.92 119
ONE 85 121 -1.93 120
LHL 120 122 -2.31 121
TUCU 122 29 -2.42 122
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Table 6: Movements in ordinary variable rate for five large banks
10 Nov
2003
17 Nov
2003
8 Dec
2003
15 Dec
2003
7 Mar
2005
14 Mar
2005
20 Jun
2005
8 May
2006
7 Aug
2006
14 Aug
2006
RBA
changes
+.25 +.25 . +.25 . . +.25 +.25 .
ANZ . +.25 . +.25 +.25 . -.70 +.25 +.25 .
CBA +.25 . +.25 . +.25 . . +.25 . +.25
NAB +.26 . +.25 . +.25 . . +.25 +.25 .
St. George . +.25 +.25 . +.25 . . +.25 . +.25
Westpac . +.25 . +.25 . +.25 . +.25 +.25 .
Table 7: Movements in ordinary variable rate for five mortgage providers (2003-2004)
10 Nov
2003
17 Nov
2003
1 Dec
2003
8 Dec
2003
15 Dec
2003
5 Jan
2004
18 Oct
2004
1 Nov
2004
RBA
changes
+.25 . . +.25 . . . .
Aussie Home
Loans (AHL)
. +.25 . . +.25 . . .
Assured Home
Loans (ASHL)
. . . . . . . +.74
CBA Online
Only (CBOA)
. . +.25 . . +.25 . .
LaTrobe
Financial Ser-
vices (LHL)
. . . +.25 . +.25 . .
Unicom
Credit Union
(TUCU)
. . . . . . -.95 .
Table 7 (continued): Movements in ordinary variable rate for five mortgage providers (2005)
7 Mar
2005
14 Mar
2005
4 Apr
2005
15 Aug
2005
3 Oct
2005
17 Oct
2005
21 Nov
2005
28 Nov
2005
RBA
changes
+.25 . . . . . . .
Aussie Home
Loans (AHL)
. +.02 . +.23 -.53 -.07 .60 .
Assured Home
Loans (ASHL)
+.25 . . . . . . -.02
CBA Online
Only (CBOA)
. . +.25 . . . . .
LaTrobe
Financial Ser-
vices (LHL)
+.25 . +.04 . . . . .
Unicom
Credit Union
(TUCU)
. +.25 . . . . . .
Table 7 (continued): Movements in ordinary variable rate for five mortgage providers (2006)
8 May
2006
15 May
2006
3 Jul
2006
7 Aug
2006
14 Aug
2006
4 Sept
2006
RBA
changes
+.25 . . +.25 . .
Aussie Home
Loans (AHL)
+.25 . . . +.25 .
Assured Home
Loans (ASHL)
. +.25 . +.25 . .
CBA Online
Only (CBOA)
. . +.24 . . +.25
LaTrobe
Financial Ser-
vices (LHL)
+.25 . . +.25 . .
Unicom
Credit Union
(TUCU)
. +.25 . . +.25 .
28
Table 8: Initial and final observations for ordinary variable rate
for five large banks and five other providers
Provider
Initial rate:
6 Jan 2003
Ending rate:
23 Oct 2006
ANZ 6.57 7.12
CBA 6.57 7.82
NAB 6.56 7.82
St. George 6.57 7.82
Westpac 6.57 7.82
Aussie Home Loans (AHL) 6.45 7.70
Assured Home Loans (ASHL) 5.45 6.92
CBA Online Only (CBOA) 6.00 7.24
LaTrobe Financial Services (LHL) 6.60 7.89
Unicom Credit Union (TUCU) 8.00 7.80
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